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 There has been much debate in the columns of newspapers as to how we should understand the 
sharing economy, but as yet, much of the debate is largely superficial, garnering little attention 
in terms of rigorous academic analysis. In this paper, I argue that the rise of the capital-
extractive sharing economy model employed by companies like Uber and Airbnb cannot be 
understood outside of the political-economic context from which it emerges. Drawing on the 
work of Marxist scholars like David Harvey, I analyze such models through the lens of 
primitive accumulation, positioning their development as positive evidence of Harvey’s theory 
that capitalism seeks to colonize new spheres of social life in order to offload the tensions of its 
own internal conflicts; in this case, labour market insecurity. Further, I argue that the rise of the 
capital-extractive sharing economy should be recognized as constituting a further entrenchment 
of the global neoliberal project, particularly as it stands to affect union organizing, force 
deregulation in favour of free market fundamentals, and further deepen the labour market 
insecurity from which it rises in the first place. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On Friday, December 4, 2015, taxi drivers in the city of Toronto moved inside City Hall 
following the end of a hunger strike at Nathan Phillips Square, demonstrating against the 
continued operations of Uber within the city—which they describe as being in violation of 
city by-laws—and renewing calls for the City to act.1 The demonstration was just the latest 
salvo in the global pushback against Uber’s inability or unwillingness to act within the 
confines of existing regulatory frameworks. This pushback has resulted in the banning of 
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Uber’s services in several jurisdictions.2 Those services are not just in conflict with 
regulatory regimes; they are representative of some of the profound political-economic 
changes occurring in many late-capitalist jurisdictions with respect to the nature of work and 
the relationship between capital and workers. These changes are central to the emergence of 
what has been called the “sharing economy,” and it is this model with which this essay is 
concerned. 
The sharing economy—a relatively recent development of late-capitalist social 
relations—has elicited rather little in terms of rigorous academic analysis. All but absent 
from the pages of peer-reviewed, scholarly journals, the debate over the political-economic 
position of the sharing economy has been largely superficial in nature. It has primarily taken 
place on both social and, more conventional, news media platforms, eluding proper analysis 
of an academic nature. Such superficial analyses have tended to focus on the surface-level 
conflicts between the businesses that operate under a sharing economy model and the union 
activities and government regulations they undercut,3 or the apparent demand for flexible 
work that such enterprises ultimately aim to exploit,4 without ever critically engaging with 
the structural and historical sources of the models themselves. The opinions espoused in 
popular news sources vary widely, from those that view the sharing economy as “hyper 
capitalism,”5 to those describing it as “one step on the route to communism,”6 and even 
those suggesting that it is merely an amalgam of the two.7 How we choose to understand the 
political-economic position of the sharing economy model will directly affect how society 
ultimately deals with its emergence politically, and so determining that position by way of a 
critical analysis is vital. It is that determination which this essay seeks to undertake. 
First, I will define the specific form of the sharing economy with which this essay is 
concerned. Broad and expansive pop-cultural definitions simply preclude a rigorous 
academic analysis in a paper of this length, and so a more specific definition must be 
developed. In fact, some proponents of the sharing economy define it so broadly as to 
include activities like recycling.8 As this paper is primarily concerned with the relationship 
between the emergence of the sharing economy and the changing nature of work, such a 
wide definition of the concept is simply unworkable. For this reason, this paper will more 
narrowly define the sharing economy as a model whereby capital is generated from the 
ownership of a platform on which re-commodified property is exchanged. This includes the 
activities of enterprises such as Uber and Airbnb, but not, for example, peer-to-peer lending 
or the activities of crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter.  
Second, I will argue in favour of a critical, class-historical analysis of the sharing 
economy as defined in this essay in more detail. I will show that the sharing economy 
emerges in a particular historical moment as the type of problem-solving approach of which 
academics like Robert Cox have been critical,9 and argue for the type of critical analysis that 
can effectively capture the structural causes of the problems which the sharing economy 
serves to address; specifically, cost-reduction and flexible work. Further, I will argue that the 
structural cause of those problems is the particular class-historical context from which they 
have emerged: the global neoliberal project. It needs to be recognized that the demand for 
cost-reduction and flexible work that has birthed this sharing economy model is not some 
fixed property of the human condition, but rather a consequence of the economic insecurity 
that has come to typify the neoliberal era. It also needs to be recognized that the global 
neoliberal project is a stage in the development of capitalism. Understanding some Marxist 
concepts like “primitive accumulation” and the Trotskian theory of uneven and combined 
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development will therefore be vital to properly identifying the political-economic position of 
the sharing economy within the context of late-capitalist development. 
All of this will lay the foundation for what will be the bulk of the actual analytical 
work of this essay. I will begin by highlighting some of the structural elements of the global 
neoliberal project—pervasive forms of economic insecurity, declining union density and 
strength, deregulation, and fiscal retrenchment—being as thorough as possible without 
delving too far into superfluous detail. There are likely many more elements of the global 
neoliberal project that are simply not immediately relevant to the development of the 
sharing economy, and so I will waste no space describing them in any great detail. Once the 
specific ideal-typical form of the sharing economy that I seek to critically analyze has been 
clearly defined, the framework for such an analysis has been established, and the pertinent 
details of the class-historical context in which the sharing economy emerges have been laid 
out, I will delve into my analysis. This will be two-fold. First, I will analyze the extent to 
which the emergence of the sharing economy has involved the exploitation of class-specific 
insecurities. Second, I will show that the sharing economy not only emerges from those 
elements of the global neoliberal project, but that it serves to further extend them, both by 
further undermining union density, and by further promoting fiscal retrenchment. 
Ultimately, I will advance the argument that the sharing economy is best understood as a 
further extension of the global neoliberal project, both because it emerges from the discrete 
conditions of the neoliberal era, and because it serves to further entrench those conditions. 
 
 
Defining the Sharing Economy 
 
Developing a definition of the sharing economy, specifically as it relates to the changing 
nature of work, is the first task that needs to be addressed. The term has been used 
interchangeably with terms such as “collaborative consumption” and “the peer-to-peer 
economy,” and has been described by The People Who Share—a social movement built 
around advocacy for the sharing economy—as follows:  
 
The Sharing Economy encompasses the following aspects: swapping, 
exchanging, collective purchasing, collaborative consumption, shared 
ownership, shared value, co-operatives, co-creation, recycling, upcycling, re-
distribution, trading used goods, renting, borrowing, lending, subscription 
based models, peer-to-peer, collaborative economy, circular economy, pay-as-
you-use economy, wikinomics, peer-to-peer lending, micro financing, micro-
entrepreneurship, social media, the Mesh, social enterprise, futurology, 
crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, cradle-to-cradle, open source, open data, user 
generated content (UGC).10 
 
This definition clearly includes a number of transactions and exchanges which have nothing 
to do with the changing nature of work, or of the relationship between capital and workers, 
and so we need to set these activities to the side if only because they are not capital-
extractive. There are several elements that are central to the capital-extractive form of the 
sharing economy with which this essay is concerned, and which are well-described in a 
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piece on the sharing economy that appeared in the magazine The Economist. Specifically, 
Rachel Botsman, the author cited in the piece, makes several distinctions between what we 
should understand to be the sharing economy—which involves the rental of underused 
assets between people—and other commonly suggested forms, such as peer-to-peer lending 
and the sale of excess electrical power back to the grid.11 Botsman also suggests that cars and 
accommodation are the two assets most commonly exchanged in this fashion, and so a 
tighter working definition can be developed by looking more specifically at the operations of 
two of the main sharing economy enterprises: Uber and Airbnb.  
In both cases, the means of production—both the fixed capital and the wage-labour—
are largely not owned or purchased by the enterprises themselves, but rather by the users of 
the platforms.12 This difference in the nature of capital ownership marks a shift in the 
capitalist mode of production, which I will return to in greater detail, but it is important to 
note at this point that this type of ownership structure is a unique component of the capital-
extractive sharing economy, and therefore a vital part of the working definition used herein. 
Specifically in the case of Uber, its drivers are not classified as employees, but rather 
independent contractors, allowing the company to save on labour costs13 while still 
extracting value from the labour of those workers. On June 17, 2015, the California Labor 
Commission ruled that Uber’s drivers were indeed employees, but, as Uber pointed out in a 
statement following the ruling, this was contrary to the determination made not only in a 
previous decision by the same Commission, but also in decisions made in five other states.14 
Suffice it to say that, regardless of any of these rulings one way or another, the informal 
nature of this particular wage-labour relationship forms an important component of the 
definition of the sharing economy used in this paper. 
It should be made clear here that my aim is to develop an ideal-typical model of the 
capital-extractive sharing economy that can be understood in the specific class-historical 
context from which it emerges. As such, the subsequent analysis derived from the use of this 
ideal-typical model will only hold explanatory to the extent that any actual model resembles 
it. If, for example, Uber was to recognize its drivers as employees rather than as 
independent contractors, the extent to which it could be defined as belonging to the sharing 
economy, and thereby, that its practices could be analyzed within the confines of the 
particular analytic framework used in this paper would be diminished. 
To summarize, the sharing economy as studied in this essay will be defined as the 
economic model which allows for the extraction of surplus value from the labour of workers 
without requiring the purchase or ownership of any of the primary means of production, 
including fixed capital and wage-labour. It is important to note that it is the primary means 
of production with which this essay is concerned, as most if not all companies in the sharing 
economy do own fixed capital. These companies have head offices and related equipment, 
and employ regular workers therein under the conventional wage-labour paradigm, but 
much of the surplus value extracted is produced by capital that these companies themselves 
do not own. 
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Critical Approaches and the Development of Capitalism 
 
The added explanatory power of critical approaches as compared to “problem-solving 
theories” in the Coxian sense may almost be taken as a given. For Cox, recognizing the 
structure of society as not only changing, but as a potential source for the conflicts or 
contradictions being studied, lends to critical theories a power of exposition that is simply 
lacking when those structural causes are not taken into account.15 In the case of the sharing 
economy, taking stock of social structures as potential sources of the problems the model 
serves to address—chiefly, cost reduction and the demand for flexible work—is crucial. It is 
simply not enough to recognize that the sharing economy serves the demand for flexible 
work; we must seek to understand where that demand is coming from. It is also essential to 
recognize that those social structures, which may or may not have given rise to the sharing 
economy, are themselves historically bound. For Cox, one benefit to the use of more critical 
approaches is that they are historically-sensitive, taking into account the changing nature of 
reality.16 Not only does the failure to recognize historical-specificity limit our ability to 
analytically engage in a comprehensive and truthful way with an ever-changing world, the 
acceptance of solutions to problems which fail to account in any meaningful way for the 
structural sources of those problems merely masks them, further entrenching rather than 
eliminating them. This is what Cox identifies as the conservative bias in problem-solving 
theory,17 and it is an analytical limitation that the emergence of the sharing economy 
requires that we avoid. To that end, Cox argues that the critical theory of historical-
materialism is particularly useful should we hope to understand the present global neoliberal 
project, because it is this version of Marxist thought that Cox suggests “reasons historically 
and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social order.”18 
For Marx, the capitalist mode of production necessarily entails the extraction of 
surplus value from the labour of the worker by the capitalist. He sees history as a process 
that arises out of the changing nature of the material conditions of this interclass conflict 
over time. In volume one of Capital, he argues that the accumulation of capital as 
understood through this class-analytic lens presupposes the existence of a capital-producing 
capital from which this surplus can be extracted, and that this presupposition constitutes a 
form of cyclical reasoning which can only be escaped by recognizing a process known as 
“primitive accumulation.”19 This is a form of “accumulation not the result of the capitalist 
mode of production, but its starting point.”20 In addition, Marx identifies primitive 
accumulation as “nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production.”21 For the purposes of this essay, it is most important to recognize that 
primitive accumulation as a historical process is not limited to the transition from pre-
capitalist to capitalist society, but that it occurs whenever the means of subsistence are 
converted into the means of production from which the capitalist can extract surplus value. 
This point is well-elaborated by Jason Read, who argues that primitive accumulation 
appears to be at work not only in the pre-capitalist conditions for the emergence of capitalist 
society, but in the extension of capitalist social relations and the capitalist mode of 
production into new spaces, both geographically by way of colonialization, and socially by 
way of constitutive social change.22 He writes: “[p]rimitive accumulation serves as the 
names for not only an event but a process, the expropriation and legislation necessary to 
destroy other economic and social relations in order to make them productive for capital. 
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Thus, primitive accumulation becomes not only a cause of the capitalist mode of production 
but its effect.”23  
As the capital-extractive sharing economy involves the re-commodification of the 
private means of subsistence—shelter and transportation, most notably—previously secured 
largely through the sale of one’s labour, this understanding of primitive accumulation as the 
process by which capitalist society colonizes new spheres of social relation for surplus value 
extraction by the capitalist is of particular note for several reasons. First, it aids us in more 
cleanly demarcating the line between the capital-extractive sharing economy models this 
essay seeks to analyze, and the more community-oriented, non-capital-extractive models, by 
showing how they uniquely emerge as a reconfiguration of capitalism that extends, rather 
than restricts, the capitalist mode of production. Second, establishing that the emergence of 
these capital-extractive sharing economy models constitutes a form of primitive 
accumulation that seeks to extend capitalist social relations into new spheres of social life 
provides the first clue as to the political-economic position of those models. In addition, 
David Harvey argues that, through primitive accumulation, “the penetration of pre-existing 
social formations by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements (such as rules 
of contract and private property arrangements)” provides a means through which capitalism 
can “absorb existing capital and labour surpluses.”24 In this sense, primitive accumulation 
can be seen to operate as a process by which capitalism protects itself against internal crises, 
such as the chronically high unemployment and pervasive labour insecurity that typify the 
neoliberal era25 which gives rise to the sharing economy. 
It is also important to recognize the Trotskian theory of uneven and combined 
development when analyzing the emergence of the sharing economy in the global context. 
As Trotsky argues, capitalism develops unevenly country to country, with those countries 
that developed capitalism inorganically—essentially all but England—skipping any number 
of transitory stages.26 As a result, these inorganic capitalist societies built their versions of 
capitalism by combining existing cultural elements with only the necessary transitory 
advances.27 These basic principles, referred to as the “laws of uneven and combined 
development,” recognize the historical specificity of any particular country’s capitalist 
development, and thereby explain the apparent differences between capitalist societies. In 
order to analyze the political-economic position of the sharing economy, we need to be able 
to account for the extensive differences in the extents to which varying capitalist 
jurisdictions have accepted or rejected its emergence. It is here that Trotsky’s ideas carry a 
great deal of importance, because the sharing economy as a development of late-capitalist, 
neoliberal society is marked by its own patterns of unevenness in the global context. 
 
 
The Global Neoliberal Project and the Sharing Economy 
 
It would be no great overstatement to suggest that the era of neoliberal globalization has 
produced profound change in the nature of work around the world. Understanding this as 
the class-historical context from which the emergence of the sharing economy can 
ultimately be seen is essential to properly locating its political-economic position. There are 
several elements of the global neoliberal project that are of particular concern when studying 
the changing nature of work and the emergence of the sharing economy to which it is 
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related, and it is these elements that I aim to focus on in this section: rising labour market 
insecurity, declining union density and strength, deregulation, and fiscal retrenchment. I 
will move through them each one by one, analyzing their relationships to the emergence of 
the sharing economy, both as causes and as effects when applicable. 
According to Guy Standing, the neoliberal era has led to a rise in seven different forms 
of labour insecurity, each of which combine to produce exactly the kind of crisis—labour 
surpluses—that Harvey suggests primitive accumulation serves to protect capitalism from.28 
First, the neoliberal erosion of the Keynesian commitment to full unemployment has led to 
a rise of what Standing calls “labour market insecurity.”29 This led in turn to a rise in 
unemployment virtually everywhere on the globe, with millions of people unemployed by 
the turn of the new millennium—more than any other period in human history.30 This rise 
in unemployment has also been coupled with a rise in “job insecurity,” or a loss in the sense 
that occupations should be stable rather than flexible,31 and “skill reproduction insecurity,” 
the result of austerity agendas which force educational institutions to become little more 
than machines that churn out human capital.32 The important thing to note here is that all of 
these forms of labour market insecurity constituted a potential crisis for capitalism. 
Deprived of the means of subsistence, the labouring class in capitalist society depends on 
wage-labour in order to facilitate social reproduction, which in turn means purchasing the 
commodities that the capitalists produce. Rising labour market insecurity constitutes a 
contradiction in this system, and it is exactly this crisis which the sharing economy takes 
advantage of. The sharing economy helps to soften the blow of rising economic insecurity 
under global neoliberalism, by providing platforms through which the economically 
insecure can combat the rising cost of living by reducing the total cost of their own means of 
subsistence, and secure additional income by re-commodifying those means of subsistence. 
Not only is this evidence that the sharing economy is a form of primitive accumulation—if 
understood as a process rather than an event—but it is also a decidedly conservative 
solution in that it protects capitalism from crisis, and, in the Coxian sense, in that it merely 
glosses over the structural causes of crisis, rather than eliminating them. 
The rise in labour insecurity as a potential precondition for the emergence of the 
sharing economy is also important to recognize in terms of the laws of uneven and 
combined development. This is because the configurations of neoliberal capitalist social 
relations tend to vary from country to country, and as such, unemployment rates tend to 
vary as well (though, of course, this is not the only factor). The interesting thing to note here 
is that many of the countries which have banned or partially banned some sharing economy 
models—Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia33—were experiencing lower total 
unemployment rates in the first years of the 2010s—typically in the 4-7% range—than were 
the countries which appear to have, in a general sense, acquiesced more willingly to the rise 
of these models (for instance, Canada and the United States, where unemployment rates 
have been higher, typically 7-9%).34 This is not to suggest that high unemployment rates are 
necessarily a direct predictor of whether or not sharing economy models will successfully 
emerge, but it is interesting to note the apparent correlation, as this likely reflects patterns of 
adherence to other politico-cultural elements of neoliberalism as well. It is accurate to say, 
however, that as a general rule, the jurisdictions which have more readily acquiesced to the 
sharing economy experience a higher rate of labour market insecurity, and it stands to 
reason; higher labour market insecurity should—at least theoretically—make people more 
willing to accept unconventional forms of labour. 
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Standing also documents a rise in what he calls “representation insecurity,” or the 
sharp decline in union density and strength over the era, which he describes as “the primary 
symptom of the crisis of labourism.”35 This is a particularly troubling development for 
Standing, who describes labour movements throughout most of the twentieth century as 
being “vanguards of social progress.”36 Declining union density and strength are the result 
of many factors vital to the institution of the global neoliberal project. These factors include: 
legislative attacks on the ability of workers to form unions, labour market insecurity and the 
general reduction in overall employment rates which result from it, the external requirement 
for labour market flexibility caused by the increasingly free movement of capital under 
globalization, the high costs and low benefits (in terms of dues) of organizing low wage or 
precarious workers, the international trend towards the decentralization of bargaining 
power, and waning public perception on the importance of unions due in part to a concerted 
ideological campaign to discredit them waged through much of the neoliberal era.37  
It is in this sense that the rise of the sharing economy needs to be recognized not as 
emergent of the global neoliberal project, but rather as an extension of it. Much of the 
resistance to the rise of sharing economy models has come from within what remains of the 
labour movement—particularly the drivers of conventional taxis.38 It has been widely 
reported that services such as Uber are able to offer the service for lower prices than the 
conventional medallion services for any number of reasons, thereby undercutting the market 
and threatening union density within the industry.39 The emergence of the sharing economy 
must therefore be recognized as a potential means by which to further advance the 
neoliberal agenda of de-unionization. The case for a neoliberal political-economic 
positioning for the sharing economy seems to be substantially bolstered by this fact. Far less 
has been made in the media of the potential conflict between union organizing and similar 
sharing economy models, like that employed by Airbnb. As many conventional hotel 
workers also continue to enjoy the benefits of union membership,40 it seems the same 
potential for undercutting the market and thereby advancing the neoliberal project of 
declining union density holds in that industry as well. Interestingly, there is at least one 
counter-movement seeking to pass an ordinance in Seattle that would allow for independent 
contractors to unionize,41 but the fact that this requires an ordinance at all does more to 
encapsulate the contradictory relationship between the sharing economy and union 
organizing than anything else. 
The third element of the global neoliberal project that needs to be examined in relation 
to the emergence of the sharing economy is that of fiscal retrenchment. This is proximately 
related to the rise in labour market insecurity in that it is partially the result of the 
precipitous decline in state intervention in the labour market in the form of employment 
insurance schemes following the decline of the Keynesian era.42 The neoliberal preference 
for austerity and low taxes is further extended by the misclassification of workers that occurs 
in the sharing economy (though by no means exclusively). A 2015 statement issued by the 
United States Department of Labor identified both diminished workplace protections—
minimum wage, employment insurance, workers’ compensation, etc.—for the workers, and 
lost tax revenues for the government as problematic outcomes of the misclassification of 
workers.43 As stated previously, Uber’s classification of workers as independent contractors 
has been upheld by several regulatory bodies, but the questionable legitimacy of conferring 
this status on employees is largely irrelevant to the question of the political-economic 
position of the sharing economy model they employ. The fact is that by identifying workers 
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in this way, the sharing economy allows capitalists to extract surplus value from those 
performing the labour while avoiding forms of payroll tax and depriving those workers of 
certain labour protections. That this reinforces both the gradual defunding of state labour 
protection regimes and the subsequent protections enjoyed by workers, while also reducing 
the tax burden of the employer, suggests that this particular wage-labour model is in a very 
fundamental way an extension of the neoliberal project. 
In his book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Harvey describes the neoliberal impetus to 
deregulate the government, writing that, within the logic of neoliberalism  
 
Privatization and deregulation combined with competition, it is claimed, 
eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve 
quality, and reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper 
commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden. 
The neoliberal state should persistently seek out internal reorganizations and 
new institutional arrangements that improve its competitive position as an 
entity vis-à-vis other states in the global market.44 
 
The emergence of the sharing economy is of important note here because, after lengthy 
battles with regulators, some jurisdictions appear to be in the process of altering, or 
preparing to alter their regulatory frameworks. As of November 2015, several cities across 
Canada, including Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver, appeared to be in some stage of the 
process of modifying regulations to accommodate Uber,45 and the City of Amsterdam 
agreed to regulatory changes to accommodate Airbnb effective January 1, 2015.46 There are 
a couple of things that are worth noting here. The first is that, in Harvey’s words, the stated 
purpose of deregulation tends to be increased competition, and in all of the aforementioned 
cases, this does appear to be the goal despite the dissimilar means of achieving it. These 
regulatory changes also recognize the importance of free enterprise within the logic of the 
neoliberal state, as “[p]rivate enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as the keys to 
innovation and wealth creation.”47 Most importantly, as Read points out, primitive 
accumulation is, at times, manifest in the “legislation necessary to destroy other economic 
and social relations in order to make them productive for capital.”48 In that sense, it needs to 
be recognized that the sharing economy is prompting regulatory changes that are merely 
legitimizing the extension of the capitalist mode of production into these new spheres of 
social relations, and so regulatory change does not necessarily mean progress. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
I began this essay by describing some of the political conflict surrounding the emergence of 
the sharing economy. The volatility of this political context adds particular urgency to the 
need for these fundamental changes in the nature of work, and of the relationship between 
capital and workers, to be subjected to a rigorous, academic analysis. Without 
understanding exactly what the implications of the emergence of the sharing economy are 
for society at large, it is simply impossible to expect governments, consumers, or activists to 
know how to react to it. However, there are some important clues as to the political-
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economic position of the sharing economy, which offer some guidance in terms of 
developing a framework for analysis. First, the sharing economy emerges at a specific point 
in history: the ascendency of a global, neoliberal order typified by rising economic 
insecurity, declining union density, fiscal retrenchment, and deregulation. Second, the 
sharing economy constitutes a shift in the social relations that form the foundation for late-
capitalist society, in that it allows capital to extract surplus value from the re-
commodification of the private means of subsistence previously obtained through 
conventional wage-labour. The historical-specificity and particular class dynamics from 
which the sharing economy emerges give compelling cause to subject it to a critical, class-
historical analysis. 
In the first instance, critical analysis itself suggests that the sharing economy is 
conservative in nature, given that it emerges as a form of problem-solving approach which 
satisfies the need for flexible work and cost reduction without attempting to understand or 
reconcile the structural sources of those tensions themselves. By that virtue, it serves only to 
preserve or strengthen those tensions. Engagement with some modern interpretations of the 
Marxist theory which seeks to understand how the capitalist mode of production can come 
to exist in a new space—primitive accumulation—provided further insights into the 
political-economic position of the sharing economy. By recognizing that the sharing 
economy exists in the re-commodification of the personal means of subsistence and 
generates a surplus for capitalists who no longer need even to purchase the fixed capital or 
the wage-labourer, it is possible to understand the sharing economy as a form of primitive 
accumulation which has developed to preserve the neoliberal brand of capitalism from its 
own internal crises—specifically, the crisis of labour surplus. This surplus of labour is the 
direct result of the labour market flexibility made necessary by the global neoliberal project, 
and so this is one of the ways that the sharing economy can be seen as emerging from the 
discrete political-economic realities of neoliberalism. 
Further evidence is found in an analysis of the Trotskian laws of uneven and combined 
development, which suggest that capitalism is neither homogenous, nor monolithic. Rather, 
capitalism is marked by an unevenness of development which appears to permeate relative 
acquiescence to both the neoliberal regime and the emergence of the sharing economy. 
Interestingly, it was noted that some of the countries which have been less willing to adopt 
regulatory changes to accommodate the sharing economy have also experienced lower 
unemployment rates than have their more accommodating counterparts, further suggesting 
a link between the political economy of neoliberalism and the political economy of the 
sharing economy. This may also constitute material evidence that the sharing economy is a 
form of primitive accumulation which develops in response to labour surplus crises of late-
capitalist development, but due to the sheer number of variables involved, analysis well 
beyond the scope of this paper would be required. 
Finally, the extent to which the sharing economy reinforces or extends some of the 
constitutive elements of the global neoliberal project solidifies the neoliberal political-
economic position of the sharing economy. First, the sharing economy serves to advance the 
project of de-unionization by undercutting the market, decreasing net union density and 
potentially even replacing steady, unionized jobs with precarious, non-unionized 
independent contractors should the undercutting prove substantial enough to provoke 
layoffs in the conventional industries. Second, the neoliberal goal of austerity is advanced by 
the classification of workers as independent contractors because doing so allows them to 
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avoid payroll taxes while leaving the workers unentitled to some of the most basic workers’ 
protections. Third, the goal of increased competition is achieved by placing pressure on 
governments to adopt regulatory changes that allow them to more easily compete with the 
conventional services. This is not an example of deregulation in the typically neoliberal 
sense of the concept, but the ends are the same, and doing so has the further benefit of 
allowing these services to operate in spaces where they might otherwise be banned. This 
further entrenches labour market insecurity, contributes to union density decline, and so on. 
Ultimately, the political-economic position of the sharing economy must be identified as 
distinctly neoliberal, because it both emerges from, and serves to reinforce constitutive 
elements of the global neoliberal project. 
It might not be all that surprising to discover that technological innovations do not 
necessarily lead to social progress, but it is important to remember that these are two distinct 
forms of progress. Technology is only as progressive as the ends for which it is used. The 
same technology that led to the carnage in Japan at the end of the Second World War also 
led to the development of medical isotopes required for life-saving diagnostics. It is possible 
that, in much the same way, the technological innovations which have allowed for the 
development of the capital-extractive, neoliberal sharing economy may also be employed for 
progressive ends, but only if we first develop a critical understanding of the patterns of social 
relations which have coalesced around them and look for alternatives.  
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